Abstract This paper introduces a novel logical framework for concept-learning called brave induction. Brave induction uses brave inference for induction and is useful for learning from incomplete information. Brave induction is weaker than explanatory induction which is normally used in inductive logic programming, and is stronger than learning from satisfiability, a general setting of concept-learning in clausal logic. We first investigate formal properties of brave induction, then develop an algorithm for computing hypotheses in full clausal theories. Next we extend the framework to induction in nonmonotonic logic programs. We analyze computational complexity of decision problems for induction on propositional theories. Further, we provide examples of problem solving by brave induction in systems biology, requirement engineering, and multiagent negotiation.
A typical induction task constructs hypotheses to explain an observation (or examples) using background knowledge. More precisely, given a first-order theory B as background knowledge and a formula O as an observation, a hypothesis H covers O under B if
where B ∧ H is consistent. This style of induction is called explanatory induction (Flach 1996) or learning from entailment (De Raedt 1997) . It is used as a normal setting in inductive logic programming (ILP) (Muggleton and De Raedt 1994; Nienhuys-Cheng and De Wolf 1997) and is also used for induction from full clausal theories (Inoue 2004) . By the definition, explanatory induction requires that a possible solution H together with B logically entails O. In other words, O is true in every model of B ∧ H . This condition is often too strong for building possible hypotheses, however. 
O : euro(1) ∧ · · · ∧ euro(20) ∧ asia(21) ∧ · · · ∧ asia(27) ∧ usa(28) ∧ · · · ∧ usa(30)
where each number represents individual students. In this case, the following clause, saying that every student is either European, Asian, or American, appears a good hypothesis:
Unfortunately, however, H does not satisfy the relation B ∧ H |= O. In fact, B ∧ H has many models in which O is not true. An instance of such a model is:
{student (1), . . . , student (30), euro(1), . . . , euro(30) }.
Explanatory induction in ILP has mainly been used for learning Horn theories. When background knowledge B and a hypothesis H are Horn theories, the intersection of all models of B ∧ H coincides with the unique minimal model (or the least model). The relation (1) then implies that O is true in the least model of B ∧ H . On the other hand, when B or H contains indefinite information, B ∧ H becomes a non-Horn theory which has multiple minimal models in general. In this case, an observation O may be true in some minimal models of B ∧ H but not every one. However, the relation (1) excludes a hypothesis H due to the existence of a (minimal) model in which O is not true. As a result, meaningful hypotheses might be unqualified as presented above.
Learning from interpretation and learning from satisfiability
Explanatory induction is used for classifying observed data and predicting unseen phenomena. By contrast, learning from interpretations (LFI) (De Raedt 1997; De Raedt and Dehaspe 1997a) seeks regularities over observed data. In LFI observations are given as interpretations, and induction seeks hypotheses which are satisfied by observations expanded by In Example 1.2, when there is a student whose nationality is unknown, LFI does not infer the hypothesis H . This is because in LFI, observations are assumed to be completely specified. Thus, if complete knowledge of observations is unavailable, one should be cautious with this approach (De Raedt and Dehaspe 1997a) .
Learning from satisfiability (LFS) (De Raedt 1997; De Raedt and Dehaspe 1997b ) is used for concept-learning in face of incompletely specified observations. By the definition, a hypothesis H covers O under B in LFS iff B ∧ H has a model satisfying O. Example 1.3 Consider again background knowledge B and the observation O in Example 1.1. Then, the hypothesis H of (2) covers O under B in LFS. In Example 1.2, H also covers O under B in LFS.
Thus, learning from satisfiability can induce the hypothesis H of (2) under both B and B . Due to its weak setting, however, the hypothesis space of LFS is generally huge. In fact, any theory H becomes a possible solution of LFS as far as it is consistent with B ∧ O. In Example 1.1, the following hypotheses: 
Brave inference and cautious inference
When B ∧ H is a non-Horn theory, B ∧ H has multiple minimal models in general. In this case, two different types of inferences, brave inference and cautious inference, are considered in nonmonotonic logics (McDermott 1982) and disjunctive logic programs (Eiter and Gottlob 1995) . Under the minimal model semantics, a formula F is a consequence of brave inference in a theory T if F is true in some minimal model of T . By contrast, F is a consequence of cautious inference in T if F is true in every minimal model of T . Brave and cautious inferences are also applied to abduction in artificial intelligence. Given background knowledge B, an observation O is explained under brave (resp. cautious) abduction if O is true in some (resp. every) minimal model of a consistent theory B ∧ H (Inoue and Sakama 1996; Eiter et al. 1997) . Here, H ⊆ A and A is a set of formulas representing candidate hypotheses (called abducibles). Given the observation O = light_off , E 1 = power_failure is the unique (minimal) explanation in cautious abduction, while E 2 = high_current as well as E 1 are two (minimal) explanations in brave abduction.
Thus, brave inference is weaker than cautious inference, and it is especially useful for hypothetical reasoning as it can compute more hypotheses than cautious one.
Outline of the paper
In this paper, we apply brave inference to induction. Brave induction can induce non-Horn clauses from a full clausal theory with incomplete observations. It is weaker than explanatory induction but stronger than learning from satisfiability, thus provides a reasonable compromise between the two frameworks. Using brave induction, the hypothesis (2) becomes a solution of both B of Example 1.1 and B of Example 1.2. Brave induction is also defined for induction from nonmonotonic logic programs containing default negation. We show potential applications of brave induction for problem solving in systems biology, requirement engineering, and multiagent negotiation.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces a logical framework of brave induction and develops a procedure for computing hypotheses. Section 3 extends the framework to induction from nonmonotonic logic programs. Section 4 analyzes computational complexity of brave induction on propositional theories. Section 5 addresses problem solving by brave induction. Section 6 discusses related issues, and Sect. 7 concludes the paper. This paper is a revised and extended version of (Sakama and Inoue 2008) . Sections 4 and 5 are new in this paper. Moreover, new considerations and additional arguments are added throughout the paper.
Brave induction

Logical framework
We first introduce a logical framework of induction considered in this paper. A first-order language L consists of an alphabet and all formulas defined over it. The definition is the standard one in the literature (Nienhuys-Cheng and De Wolf 1997) . For induction we use a clausal language which is a subset of L.
A clausal theory (or simply a theory) is a finite set of clauses of the form:
where each A i (1 ≤ i ≤ n) is an atom. Any variable in a clause is assumed to be universally quantified at the front. A clause of the above form is also written as The names of brave and cautious induction are taken from brave and cautious inferences. Under the minimal model semantics, a formula F is a consequence of cautious inference in a theory T if it is true in every minimal model of T , while F is a consequence of brave inference in T if F is true in some minimal model of T .
2 When a theory contains indefinite or incomplete information, brave inference infers more results than cautious inference in general. Brave and cautious inferences have been used in different reasoning tasks of deduction and abduction in artificial intelligence. It is thereby natural to apply these inferences to induction from non-Horn theories containing indefinite or incomplete information.
Relations between explanatory induction, cautious induction, and brave induction are as follows. 
Proposition 2.6 provides a property that distinguishes brave induction from cautious and explanatory induction. This property implies that given a series of observations, brave induction is not adapted for performing incremental computation of candidate hypotheses in general. Such an incremental computation is done in brave induction for hypotheses that are also solutions of cautious or explanatory induction. Table 1 summarizes comparison of properties between brave, cautious and explanatory induction. By the table, we can observe that cautious induction and explanatory induction share similar properties. In fact, the difference between cautious and explanatory induction (Minker 1982) .
Example 2.4 Let B = {p(a) ∨ q(b)} be background knowledge which has two minimal models {p(a)} and {q(b)}. Then, H = true covers the observation O 1 = {p(a)} under B in brave induction, while H does not cover the observation O 2 = {p(b)}. In this case, the GCWA derives ¬p(b) but does not derive ¬p(a).
It is worth noting that explanatory induction in Horn theories assumes that the background Horn theory B has no minimal model satisfying O. 5 In this case, ¬O is derived from B under the closed world assumption (CWA) (Reiter 1978) . Thus, brave induction in non-Horn theories is considered a natural extension of explanatory induction in Horn theories. In the next subsection, we develop an algorithm for computing brave induction.
Computation
In this section, we develop an algorithm for computing brave induction. We first characterizes the brave induction problem. Throughout the section, the following conditions are assumed on the syntax of observations and hypotheses.
1. An observation O is a finite set of ground atoms. 2. A hypothesis H is a finite clausal theory such that each clause has the non-empty head.
The first condition is assumed as the normal problem setting in ILP (Nienhuys-Cheng and De Wolf 1997). The second condition is also natural with the following reason. When B has no minimal model satisfying O, we introduce H to B to get a minimal model satisfying O. However, introducing negative clauses to B has an effect of eliminating minimal models of B but does not contribute to obtaining a new minimal model. So the exclusion of negative clauses in H is not a strong restriction.
The procedure for computing brave induction consists of four steps.
Step 1: Computing ground hypotheses By Proposition 2.7, a solution of brave induction is obtained by computing H satisfying
and
By (5), it holds that
¬H ∨ F is thus obtained by deduction from B ∧ ¬O. This technique is inverse entailment that was originally proposed by Muggleton for induction in Horn theories (Muggleton 1995) , and was later extended by Inoue to full clausal theories (Inoue 2004) . As H is a clausal theory, put
where
Since F is a disjunction of ground atoms, every formula ¬H ∨ F in (7) is a disjunctive normal form. From B ∧ ¬O, a number of DNF formulas could be deduced. Among them, we take DNF formulas obtained as follows.
Definition 2.2 (Prime clause, prime CNF)
A ground clause C is called a prime clause with respect to a theory T if T |= C but T |= C for any C ⊂ C. A prime CNF formula with respect to T is a conjunction of prime clauses with respect to T .
First, compute prime CNF formulas with respect to B ∧ ¬O. Prime CNF formulas are computed by a system of consequence-finding such as (Inoue 1992) . Second, given a prime
holds, and we identify the DNF formula ¬H ∨ F of (7) with d 1 ∨· · ·∨d l . After deriving such a ground DNF formula, the next task is to separate ¬H and F in d 1 ∨ · · · ∨ d l . This is simply done as follows. By the assumption, i in H is non-empty, so that ¬H is a DNF formula in which each disjunct ¬ i ∧ i of (9) contains at least one negative literal. Thus, from the DNF formula d 1 ∨ · · · ∨ d l , ¬H is extracted by selecting disjuncts containing negative literals. Hence, H is obtained as a ground clausal theory.
Step 2: Generalization
As H is a clausal theory containing no variable, we generalize H in the next step. For this purpose, we use Plotkin's least generalization under subsumption (LGS) (Plotkin 1970) .
Let H be a clausal theory obtained by Step 1. Then, H is partitioned into
where each H i (1 ≤ i ≤ n) is a conjunction of comparable clauses. 7 Next, the LGS of each H i is computed and collected as
where lgs(H i ) represents the result of LGS of H i . Note that since each H i is a set of comparable clauses, lgs(H i ) is a clause with the non-empty head.
Step 3: Constructing a weak form of hypotheses We next consider a method of constructing a weaker hypothesis for brave induction. For each clause lgs(H 1 ), . . . , lgs(H n ) of (11), take the greatest specialization under implication (GSI) (Nienhuys-Cheng and De Wolf 1997). The GSI of any finite set of clauses exists and is computed by taking a disjunction as
By lgs(
. . , n, the GSI (12) provides a formula which is weaker than each lgs(H i ).
Step 4: Optimization Hypotheses computed in the above steps generally contain clauses or atoms that are useless or have no direct connection to explaining the observation. In this step, hypotheses are optimized to extract meaningful information. 
Given a clause C with the non-empty body, an atom A is isolated in C if there is no atom A ( = A) in C such that A and A are linked.
Optimization is done in two steps.
Remove any isolated atom from the body of any clause lgs(H
i ) (1 ≤ i ≤ n).
Remove any clause lgs(H
i ) (1 ≤ i ≤ n) that is subsumed by another clause lgs(H j ) (1 ≤ j ≤ n).
The result of such reduction on lgs(H i ) is denoted by lgs * (H i ). When B ∧ lgs(H i ) is consistent, the reduction is performed as far as B ∧ lgs
* (H i ) is consistent. Finally, put 
Step 4, it holds that lgs Note that BRAIN is not complete with respect to solutions of brave induction. This is because we reduce seemingly useless hypotheses in the optimization phase of Step 4. We do not consider the incompleteness of the algorithm a serious flaw, however. This is because there may exist possibly infinite solutions for explaining observations in general, and it seems meaningless to guarantee the completeness for computing tons of useless hypotheses. We select candidate solutions to reduce the hypothesis space at the cost of giving up completeness.
Example 2.6 Consider background knowledge B and the observation O:
BRAIN computes candidate hypotheses as follows.
(
Step 1) B ∧ ¬O entails the prime clauses:
Taking the conjunction of them, the prime CNF formula:
which is equivalent to B ∧ ¬O, is computed. Next, an irredundant DNF formula ¬H 1 ∨ ¬H 2 ∨ ¬H 3 ∨ F is obtained where
By this, ground hypotheses: (20)), (27)),
are obtained.
Step 2) The LGS of each H i becomes
Step 3) By each lgs(H i ), the greatest specialization becomes
(Step 4) The atom teacher(0) is isolated in each lgs(H i ) (i = 1, 2, 3), so it is removed from the body of each clause. Since B ∧ i lgs
On the other hand, for the disjunction F of ground atoms:
As a result, H ∧ and H ∨ become two solutions of brave induction. Note that if there are negative clauses (1)). Hence, the result holds.
In Example 2.6, H ∧ also becomes a solution of cautious induction.
Brave induction in nonmonotonic logic programming
As presented in Sect. 2, brave induction is useful for learning theories with indefinite or incomplete information. Incomplete information is also represented as default rule in logic programming. In this section, we consider brave induction in nonmonotonic logic programs.
Answer set programming
Answer set programming (ASP) (Lifschitz 2002) represents incomplete knowledge in a logic program and realizes nonmonotonic default reasoning. In ASP a logic program is described by an extended disjunctive program (EDP). An EDP (or simply a program) is a set of rules of the form: where body(r) = body + (r) ∪ not_body − (r). A rule r is disjunctive if head(r) contains more than one literal. A rule r is a constraint if head(r) = ∅; and r is a fact if body(r) = ∅. A program is NAF-free if no rule contains NAF-literals. A rule r 1 subsumes a rule r 2 if head(r 1 )θ ⊆ head(r 2 ) and body(r 1 )θ ⊆ body(r 2 ) hold for some substitution θ . A program, rule, or literal is ground if it contains no variable. A program P with variables is a shorthand of its ground instantiation Ground(P ), the set of ground rules obtained from P by substituting variables in P by elements of its Herbrand universe in every possible way. Two literals L 1 and L 2 have the same sign if both L 1 and L 2 are positive literals (or negative literals). A set S of ground literals is consistent if L ∈ S implies ¬L / ∈ S for any literal L; otherwise, S is contradictory. A set S of literals satisfies a program P if body + (r) ⊆ S and body − (r) ∩ S = ∅ imply head(r) ∩ S = ∅ for any rule r in Ground(P ). The semantics of an EDP is defined by the answer set semantics (Gelfond and Lifschitz 1991) . Let Lit be the set of all ground literals in the language of a program. Suppose a program P and a set of literals S(⊆ Lit). Then, the reduct P S is the program which contains the ground rule head(r) ← body + (r) iff there is a rule r in Ground(P ) such that body − (r) ∩ S = ∅. Given an NAF-free EDP P , let S be a set of ground literals that is (i) closed under P , i.e., for every ground rule r in Ground(P ), body(r) ⊆ S implies head(r) ∩ S = ∅; and (ii) logically closed, i.e., it is either consistent or equal to Lit. An answer set of an NAFfree EDP P is a minimal set S satisfying both (i) and (ii). Given an EDP P and a set S of ground literals, S is an answer set of P if S is an answer set of P S . A program has none, one, or multiple answer sets in general. The set of all answer sets of P is written as AS(P ). An answer set is consistent if it is not Lit. A program P is consistent if it has a consistent answer set; otherwise, P is inconsistent. 
Brave induction in ASP
In this section, we consider the following problem setting:
• background knowledge B is given as an EDP, • an observation O is given as a set of ground literals, • a hypothesis H is a finite set of rules.
Then, brave induction in ASP is defined as follows. In contrast to Proposition 2.2, the condition of Proposition 3.1 is not a necessary one. By the proof of Proposition 3.2, it is observed that the same necessary condition holds for cautious induction. There are algorithms for computing cautious induction in ASP (Sakama 2005) . In what follows, we develop a procedure for computing brave induction in ASP. As the case of clausal theories, the problem of our interest is the case when B has no answer set including O. It is worth noting that in case of clausal theories, the consistency of B ∧ H implies the consistency of B, H , and O. On the other hand, in case of ASP, the consistency of B ∪ H implies the consistency of O, but it does not necessarily imply the consistency of B or H . In fact, an inconsistent program B having no answer set can recover consistency by introducing an appropriate H . For a technical reason, however, we assume the consistency of B in the rest of this section. In case of brave induction from clausal theories, inverse entailment is used for computing hypotheses. However, it is known that inverse entailment in classical logic is not applied to nonmonotonic logic programs (Sakama 2000) . We then consider another method for computing possible hypotheses.
Step 1: Computing ground hypotheses
We first introduce a notion used in this step.
Definition 3.2 (Relevant) Let L 0 be a ground literal and S a set of ground literals. Then,
Given an observation O, let = {L | L ∈ Lit and pred(L) appears in O}. Suppose that background knowledge B has a consistent answer set S. Then, construct a finite and consistent set R of ground rules satisfying the following conditions. For any rule r ∈ R, 1. head(r) ⊆ O and for any L ∈ O, there is a rule r ∈ R such that head(r) = {L}.
body
+ (r) = {L | L ∈ S and L is relevant to the literal in head(r)}.
and L is relevant to the literal in head(r) and appears in Ground(P )}.
The third condition requires that no rule contains default negation of literals in S ∪ . The reason is that if body − (r) contains literals from S, body(r) may contain both L in body + (r) and not L in body − (r), which makes the rule meaningless. Also, if body − (r) contains literals from , r may contain a negative loop that would make a program inconsistent. By its construction, different hypotheses are constructed by different answer sets in general.
Step 2: Generalization
The notion of LGS is extended to rules containing default negation. It is done by syntactically viewing rules as "clauses". That is, identify disjunction ";" with the classical one "∨, and any NAF-literal "not p(t 1 , . . . , t n )" with a new atom "not_p(t 1 , . . . , t n )" with the predicate "not_p". ¬p is also considered a predicate "¬_p" and is considered a predicate different from p. With this setting, the notion of comparable set of rules is defined as Definition 2.3, and the LGS of a comparable set of rules is defined in the same manner as the one in clausal theories (Sakama 2001) . The generalization phase is similar to the case of clausal theories. For the set R of rules obtained by the Step 1, R is partitioned as R = R 1 ∪ · · · ∪ R n where each R i (1 ≤ i ≤ n) is a comparable set of ground rules. Then, the LGS of each R i is computed and collected as lgs(R) = {lgs(R 1 ), . . . , lgs(R n )}.
Step 3: Constructing a weak form of hypotheses
To construct a weak form of hypotheses, we introduce the notion of cardinality constraint rules (Niemelä et al. 1999) . A cardinality constraint rule is a rule of the form:
where h and k are two integers such that h ≤ k. The rule (14) means if the body holds then at least h and at most k literals in the head hold. This type of rules is useful for representing knowledge in ASP and is used in the smodel system (Niemelä et al. 1999 
. , lgs(R n ).
Step 4: Optimization Optimization is done in two steps. First, remove any isolated literal from the body of any rule lgs(R i ) (1 ≤ i ≤ n). Here, the notion of "isolated literal" in a rule is defined by replacing a clause with a rule, and an atom with a literal in Definition 2.4. Second, remove any rule lgs(R i ) (1 ≤ i ≤ n) that is subsumed by another rule lgs(R j ) (1 ≤ i ≤ n). Let lgs * (R i ) be the result of such reduction over lgs (R i 
Since O is independent of B, every predicate in head(r) appears nowhere in B so that T is a consistent set of literals. As every literal in O appears in the head of some rule r in R, T is a consistent answer set of B ∪ R such that O ⊆ T . Next, we show that B ∪ lgs(R) has a consistent answer set such that O ⊆ U . Let R = R 1 ∪· · ·∪R n . By the definition, lgs(R i )θ ⊆ r for any r ∈ R i (1 ≤ i ≤ n) with some ground substitution θ . Then, for any rule r ∈ R i , body 
Proof Let r = CCR(lgs(R 1 ), . . . , lgs(R n )).
For any ground instance of rθ satisfying body + (rθ ) ⊆ S and body − (rθ ) ∩ S = ∅ for some answer set S of B, a set T of literals is constructed in a way that a literal L is selected from the head of each rθ whenever L ∈ O. Since O is independent of B, S ∪T is consistent. Then, U = S ∪T becomes a consistent answer set of B ∪ {CCR(lgs(R 1 ), . . . , lgs(R n ))} and O ⊆ U . When B ∪ {CCR(lgs * (R 1 ), . . . , lgs * (R n ))} is consistent, U also becomes a consistent answer set of B ∪ H ∨ .
By Lemmas 3.7 and 3.8, we have the next result.
Theorem 3.9 (Soundness) Any hypothesis computed by BRAIN not becomes a solution of brave induction.
BRAIN not is incomplete with respect to solutions of brave induction, since it reduces seemingly useless hypotheses in the optimization phase.
Example 3.4 There are two couples, Adam and Nancy, and Bob and Jane. They plan to go to either sea or mountain on this weekend. Each couple can select one of them, but a husband and a wife go to the same place. The situation is represented as background knowledge B:
where the predicates s, m and c mean sea, mountain and couple, respectively, and the constants a, n, b and j mean Adam, Nancy, Bob and Jane, respectively. B has four answer sets:
c(b, j ), m(a), m(n), s(b), s(j )}, S 4 = {c(a, n), c(b, j ), m(a), m(n), m(b), m(j )}.
Suppose the observation that Adam and Nancy are tanned, but Bob and Jane are not. It is represented as:
where the predicate t mean tanned.
BRAIN not constructs candidate hypotheses as follows. (Step 1) First, an answer set of B, for instance S 2 , is selected. A set R of rules is then constructed as:
Note that the body of each rule contains literals that are relevant to the literal in the head.
Step 2) Next, the lgs(R) is constructed as
¬t (y) ← c(b, j ), m(y), not s(y).
(Step 3) Third, from the rules in lgs(R), the cardinality constraint rule is constructed as
(a, n), c(b, j ), s(x), m(y), not m(x), not s(y).
(Step 4) Finally, isolated literals c(a, n) and c(b, j ) are removed, and H ∧ and H ∨ become
which are two solutions of brave induction.
Computational complexity
In this section, we consider computational complexity of brave induction. Throughout the section, we assume that background knowledge, hypotheses, and observations are all represented over a finite propositional language.
12
The following two decision problems are considered.
-Existence: Given background knowledge B and an observation O, deciding whether O has a solution of brave induction under B. -Verification: Given background knowledge B and an observation O, deciding whether a given hypothesis H is a solution of brave induction under B.
We consider these problems in the context of clausal theories (CT) and answer set programming (ASP), and compare complexity results between brave induction and cautious induction. (2) To show the result, we consider a complementary problem: a ground clausal theory B ∧ H has no minimal model satisfying a conjunction O of ground atoms. This is a task of the extended GCWA and is known P 2 -complete (Eiter and Gottlob 1995) , so that the verification problem is To show complexity results in ASP, we introduce a program transformation. Let r be a ground rule of the form
Theorem 4.1 In clausal theories the following complexity results hold.
Deciding the existence of solutions in brave induction is NP-complete. The same complexity result holds for cautious induction.
Deciding whether a given hypothesis is a solution of brave induction is
The propositional formula φ(r) associated with r is defined as
Thus, any negative literal ¬A in r is transformed to a new atom A, and default negation notL is transformed to a negative literal ¬L in φ(r). Given a ground EDP P , we define a propositional theory φ(P ) as 1. for any r ∈ P , φ(r) is in φ(P ). 2. for any positive literal L ∈ Lit, the following formula is in φ(P )
Given a set S of literals, S is the set of atoms which is obtained from S by replacing every negative literal ¬L with the corresponding atom L. Conversely, given a set M of atoms, M ¬ is the set of literals which is obtained from M by replacing every atom L with the corresponding negative literal ¬L.
Proposition 4.2 If an EDP P is consistent, so is φ(P ).
Proof If P is consistent, there is a consistent minimal set S of literals such that (16) in P . In this case, S satisfies both (17) and (18). Hence, φ(P ) is consistent.
Theorem 4.3
In ASP the following complexity results hold. Since deciding the consistency of the propositional theory φ(B ∪ O) is NP-complete, the result holds. By Proposition 3.4, brave induction has a solution iff cautious induction has a solution. Hence, the same complexity result holds for cautious induction.
Deciding the existence of solutions in brave induction is NP-complete. The same complexity result holds for cautious induction.
Deciding whether a given hypothesis is a solution of brave induction is
(2) Deciding whether some (resp. every) consistent answer set S of B ∪H satisfies O ⊆ S is P 2 -complete (resp. P 2 -complete) (Eiter and Gottlob 1995) . Hence, the result holds.
The complexity results are summarized in Table 2 . In the table, every entry represents completeness for the respective class. These complexity results show that brave and cautious induction are in the same complexity class for checking the existence of solutions. It is worth noting that extending the language from CT to ASP does not lead to a complexity increase in this problem. On the other hand, for the task of solution verification, the complexity of brave induction is one level higher in the polynomial hierarchy than that of cautious induction in CT. By contrast, the complexities of brave induction and cautious induction are at the same level of the polynomial hierarchy in ASP.
Problem solving by brave induction
Systems biology
In this section, we show the use of brave induction for inference of master reactions from biochemical networks in systems biology. It is a crucial feature of flux distributions that metabolic reactions with fluxes spanning several orders of magnitude coexist under the same conditions (Almaas et al. 2004) . Although most metabolic reactions have low fluxes, the overall behavior of metabolism is dominated by several reactions with very high fluxes. In (Yamamoto et al. 2009 ), the states of each enzyme reaction is simply divided into two kinds, activated and non-activated, in order to analyze which chemical reactions have high fluxes. This analysis is helpful to solve the differential equations associated with reactions by ignoring non-activated reactions with low fluxes. We apply brave induction to hypothesis-finding in biochemical networks. Consider a simple chemical reaction represented in Fig. 3 .
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In Fig. 3 , the two reactions involve the same substrate s 1 and are catalyzed by the enzymes e 1 and e 2 , then lead to the products p 1 and p 2 , respectively. These two reactions are represented by the formulas:
Assume that the levels of concentration of compounds are classified into five, l 1 , . . . , l 5 , 14 and that the concentration levels of the products p 1 and p 2 are as follows: Next, suppose that the two enzymes e 1 and e 2 are of the same type t : E = {class(e 1 , t), class(e 2 , t)}.
Let background knowledge be B = R ∪ E. Then, the next hypothesis H becomes a solution of brave induction.
The above H cannot be induced by explanatory or cautious induction. The hypothesis H represents that an enzyme reaction of the type t leads to a product with low-level concentration that is either at level l 1 or l 2 . In other words, an enzyme of the type t is non-activated or is inhibited by some reason. Note that, if the concentration level of p 1 is the same as that of p 2 , ordinary systems of explanatory induction can also induce an appropriate hypothesis. However, when we consider multiple levels of concentration, the hypothesis by brave induction is considered more useful.
In general, brave induction can induce a causal rule which combines multiple states as alternative effects. To infer master reactions correctly from biochemical pathways, it is necessary to set background knowledge appropriately. This task often involves abduction (Tamaddoni-Nezhad et al. 2006; Yamamoto et al. 2009 ), but causal rules given in background knowledge are often incomplete. Brave induction can thus be useful to complete missing causal rules in these applications.
Requirements engineering
Requirements engineering involves the elicitation of high-level stakeholder goals that are described by scenarios of desirable and undesirable system behavior. Alrajeh et al. (2007) introduce an ILP framework for inferring requirements from a set of scenarios and incomplete requirements specification. Scenarios represent examples of desirable and undesirable system behavior over time, while the requirements specification captures the initial but incomplete background knowledge of the envisioned system and its environment. The task is then to complete the specification by learning a set of missing requirements that cover all of the desirable scenarios but none of the undesired ones. Formally, the problem is specified as follows:
Given: a requirement specification Spec, a set Des of desirable scenarios, and a set Und of undesirable scenarios Find: a set Pre of event precondition axioms satisfying the conditions:
where |= M means an entailment relation under an LTL 15 model M.
Any set of event precondition axioms that satisfy these two properties is said to be a correct extension of a requirements specification with respect to the given scenarios. The specification and scenarios are represented by event calculus normal logic programs. They compute Pre satisfying that Spec ∪ Pre has a stable model M such that every element in Und is false M and every element in Des is consistent with M. Incidentally, their program transformation produces a normal logic program Spec ∪ Pre which has a single stable model, but it is inherently a problem of brave induction.
Multiagent negotiation
Negotiation is a process of reaching agreement between different agents. In a typical oneto-one negotiation, an agent makes a proposal on his/her request and the opponent agent decides whether it is acceptable or not. If a proposal is unacceptable as it is, an agent seeks conditions to accept it by extending his/her current belief to accommodate another agent's request. Sakama (2008) formulates the process of building conditions in terms of induction. Given the current belief B of an agent and a proposal G of another agent, B could accept G under the condition H if:
where B ∪ H is consistent. Here, H is a condition that bridges the gap between the current belief of an agent and the request made by another agent. Viewing G as an observation, the problem of finding H is considered a process of building a hypothesis to explain G under B.
When B contains multiple minimal models or answer sets, however, the relation B ∪H |= G is strong. This is because an agent would have alternative options for a deal, and the cautious inference requires that the proposal G must be satisfied in every possible option. To relax the condition, Sakama uses brave induction for negotiation. That is, B could accept G under the condition H if B ∪ H has an answer set satisfying G.
Example 5.1 Consider negotiation between a buyer and a seller. A seller agent has the knowledge base B which consists of the following rules:
← product (pc, x), product(pc, y) 
pay_cash; pay_card ← .
Here, the rule (19) represents that the normal price of a PC is 1500 USD. The rule (20) represents a constraint that the same pc cannot have different prices at the same time. The rule (21) represents if discount is made by payment with cash, the normal price is withdrawn. The rule (22) represents two options for payment. With this setting, B has two answer sets: 
Discussion
In the previous sections, we mainly compared brave induction with explanatory or cautious induction. Here, we compare brave induction with other forms of induction. The converse implication of Proposition 6.1 does not hold in general. Since brave induction is weaker than both explanatory and cautious induction (Proposition 2.1), the following relation holds. explanatory induction < cautious induction < brave induction < learning from satisfiability where X < Y means that any solution of X is also a solution of Y , but not vice versa.
Compared with brave induction, LFS does not require the minimality of models. So any theory H becomes a solution as far as it is consistent with B ∧ O. Due to its weak condition, the hypothesis space for LFS is generally huge, and additional language bias would be necessary for practical usage. Brave induction is considered as a strengthened version of LFS, that is, we imposed the condition of minimality on models of B ∧ H satisfying O. It is known that LFS does not satisfy the property of "conjunction of solutions" in Sect. 2.1 (De Raedt and Dehaspe 1997b). The following example illustrates that LFS also does not satisfy the property of "conjunction of observations". One open question for further research is how learning from satisfiability (which employs a monotonic logic) could be used for inducing nonmonotonic logic programs.
In Definition 3.1, brave induction is defined as inducing hypothesis H such that B ∪ H has a consistent answer set S satisfying O ⊆ S. The definition is considered a strengthened version of LFS in nonmonotonic logic programs. Then,
are two weak generalizations, while
is a strong generalization.
In Example 6.2, none of H 1 , H 2 , and H 3 becomes a solution of brave induction. Solutions by brave induction are, for instance, 16 Helft's semantics is often called nonmonotonic ILP, but we reserve the term for induction from nonmonotonic logic programs. Helft's semantics is similar to LFI in spirit (De Raedt and Dehaspe 1997a), while it is also viewed as an instance of confirmatory induction (De Raedt and Lavrač 1993; Lachiche 2000) . 17 Helft imposes additional conditions on the satisfiability of H in a model of B ∧ O, but we neglect them to make discussion simple.
which are also solutions of LFI. Note that H 4 or H 5 does not become a solution of cautious induction, while H 4 ∪ H 5 becomes a solution of cautious induction.
On the other hand, if the fact american(Mary) is added to B, H 4 and H 5 are still solutions of brave induction but H 4 is not a solution of LFI anymore. This is because H 4 is not satisfied in B ∪ {american(Mary)}. Thus, brave induction is neither stronger nor weaker than LFI. Generally speaking, LFI does not explain why particular individuals are observed under background knowledge. In fact, LFI does not distinguish between B and O. Moreover, LFI assumes that all observations are completely specified, so that it has no mechanism of predicting unseen phenomena. This is in contrast to brave or cautious induction which has a mechanism of prediction.
Confirmatory induction or descriptive induction (Lachiche 2000) 
together with the Clark's equality axioms. Thus, H 1 , . . . , H 5 are all solutions of confirmatory induction.
Like LFI, brave induction is neither stronger nor weaker than confirmatory induction in general.
6.3 Induction in nonmonotonic logic programs Otero (2001) introduces a framework for learning positive/negative examples in normal logic programs.
18 He considers induction from several sets of examples such that: given a normal logic program P and several sets of examples E 1 , . . . , E n where Ray (2008) develops a nonmonotonic ILP system, called XHAIL, which combines abduction and induction for building hypotheses. The background theory is given as a normal logic program, and its semantics is given by the stable model semantics. Given examples, XHAIL first computes explanations by brave abduction. Next, XHAIL constructs ground rules as hypotheses by putting abductive explanations in heads of rules and putting deductive consequences of B in bodies of rules. In this phase, a mode declaration specifies atoms appearing in heads and bodies of possible hypotheses. Finally, the ground hypotheses are generalized in the inductive phase. The resulting hypothesis becomes a solution of brave induction because it is constructed from explanations of brave abduction. In this sense, it is said that XHAIL realizes brave induction. However, the paper (Ray 2008) does not mention any motivation of brave induction apart from technical reasons, nor investigate any formal property of brave induction. In fact, temporal theories in event calculus provided as a case study in (Ray 2008) always have a single stable model, and the result of brave induction coincides with that of cautious induction in this case study.
Further extensions and issues
In brave induction, B ∧ H has a minimal model in which an observation O is satisfied. In this case, H covers the positive observation O under B. In ILP, on the other hand, negative observations as well as positive ones are also handled. Given a negative observation N , it is required that H uncovers N under B. This condition is logically represented as B ∧ H |= N . Definition 2.1 is extended to handle negative observations as follows.
Definition 6.1 Let B be background knowledge, P a positive observation, and N a negative observation. A hypothesis H is a solution of brave induction if B ∧ H has a minimal model M such that M |= P and M |= N .
Note that we are interested in minimal models in which a positive observation P is true, so a negative observation N is requested to be false in those minimal models. By putting O = P ∧ ¬N , the above definition reduces to Definition 2.1 and negative observations are handled within the framework of this paper. In this paper, we introduced induction algorithms which produce clauses or rules that define more than one predicate. The problem is known as multiple predicate learning (MPL) (De Raedt and Lavrač 1996) . In MPL the order of learning different clauses affects the results of learning tasks and even the existence of solutions, especially in the presence of negative observations (De Raedt and Lavrač 1993) . As discussed in Sect. 2.1, however, brave induction is not adapted for incremental learning in general. Given an observation O containing multiple predicates, BRAIN computes a candidate hypothesis H based on the relation B ∧ ¬O |= ¬H ∨ F at once. Those hypotheses are verified by checking the consistency of B ∧ H ∧ ¬F .
Brave induction proposed in this paper uses minimal models as a semantical basis. Due to its minimality, however, it often fails to induce useful hypotheses. is not a solution of brave induction.
The problem of Example 6.6 is that B ∧ H does not allow any student to take more than one course. In other words, disjunction is interpreted exclusively under the minimal model semantics. To allow H as a solution for explaining O, a semantics which allows inclusive interpretations is necessary. A semantics which allows both exclusive and inclusive interpretations of disjunction in a logic program is known as the possible model semantics (Sakama and Inoue 1994) . For instance, the disjunctive clause p ∨ q has three possibles models {p}, {q}, and {p, q}, of which {p} and {q} are minimal models. Thus, the possible model semantics considers non-minimal models as well as minimal ones. Brave induction under the possible model semantics is defined by replacing minimal models with possible models in Definition 2.1. In Example 6.6, B ∧ H has the possible model: {math(John), math(Mary), physics(John), chemistry(Mary)}, so that H becomes a solution of brave induction for explaining O under the possible model semantics. Recently, it is known that the possible model semantics characterizes the semantics of cardinality constraint rules in ASP (Marek et al. 2007 ).
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Conclusion
This paper introduced a logical framework of brave induction and developed algorithms in both full clausal theories and answer set programming. The utility of brave induction in problem solving was illustrated in systems biology, requirements engineering, and multiagent negotiation. Brave induction is different from the existing frameworks for induction, and provides an intermediate solution between learning from satisfiability and explanatory induction. Compared with existing frameworks, brave induction has an advantage for managing incompleteness which may arise in background knowledge, hypotheses and observations.
Brave and cautious inferences are widely used for commonsense reasoning from incomplete knowledge. In hypothetical reasoning, two different types of abduction under brave and cautious inferences are used in the literature. Since abduction and induction are both hypothetical reasoning extending background knowledge to explain observations (Flach and Kakas 2000) , brave induction proposed in this paper has a right place and serves as a natural extension of brave abduction.
There are several directions for future work. From a theoretical viewpoint, this paper considered the minimal model semantics in clausal theories. Such a minimal model is defined by minimizing all predicates, but there is a notion of (P , Z)-minimal models in circumscription (McCarthy 1980) in which only some selected predicates P are minimized and some Z can be varied. Circumscriptive induction has been proposed in (Inoue and Saito 2004) by unifying descriptive and explanatory induction, so brave induction would be considered in the context of circumscriptive induction. From a computational viewpoint, the BRAIN procedure introduced in this paper is naive and needs further optimization. In particular, the introduction of inductive bias is important in practical setting. Implementing an efficient procedure for brave induction and validating its effect in practical applications are left for future work.
